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‘Folk psychology’ is a term that refers to the way that ordinary people think and
talk about minds. But over roughly the last four decades the term has come to be
used in rather dierent ways by philosophers and psychologists engaged in tech-
nical projects in analytic philosophy of mind and empirical psychology, many of
which are only indirectly related to the question of how ordinary people actually
think about minds.e result is a sometimes puzzling body of academic literature,
cobbled together loosely under that single heading, that contains a number of ter-
minological inconsistencies, the clarication of which seems to reveal conceptual
problems. is paper is an attempt to approach folk psychology more directly, to
clarify the phenomenon of interest, and to examine the methods used to investi-
gate it. Having identied some conceptual problems in the literature, I argue that
those problems have occluded a particular methodological confound involved in
the study of folk psychology, one associated with psychological language, that may
well be intractable. Rather than attempt to solve thatmethodological problem, then,
I suggest that we use the opportunity to rethink the relationship between folk psy-
chology and its scientic counterpart. A careful look at the study of folk psychology
may prove surprisingly helpful for clarifying the nature of psychological science and
addressing the contentious question of its status as a potentially autonomous special
science.
Keywords: folk psychology, theory of mind, mindreading, autonomy of psychology,
theory-theory, philosophical methodology, psychological language
1. What is folk psychology?
Without any specialized training in psychology, people appear to think about
—and certainly talk about—mental states. ey talk about such states as
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though they were real things in the head, both in their own heads and in
the heads of others. at is, they seem to have mental state concepts like
beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, wishes, dreams, intentions, and so forth. And,
further, they seem to use their understanding of those concepts to predict
and explain what others will do, and even to explain what they have done
themselves, almost as though they were applying a kind of general theory
about the relationship between mental states and behavior to specic cases.
Why does Bill Bob tear the pages out of his pocket bible? Because he believes
it is a checkbook and he wants to buy some candy.1
‘Folk psychology’ is the term coined by philosophers for this common-
sensical understanding of the mind or mental content.2 Folk psychology is
a kind of psychology, but the ‘folk’ prex indicates that the subject matter
needs to be dierentiated from the subject matter of other forms of psychol-
ogy, perhaps most obviously, from academic psychology. Academic psy-
chology is the scientic study of the mind. Folk psychology, by contrast, is
the unscientic understanding of the mind as possessed by, for want of bet-
ter terms, laypeople or folk—people with no special training in the formal
academic or scientic study of the mind.
It may help to observe that the term ‘folk psychology’ mirrors the term
‘folk physics,’ which similarly distinguishes the putatively commonsensical
theory of physics ubiquitous among laypeople from the kind of physics
taught in formal academic settings.3 Just as laypeople possess basic ideas or
a basic understanding (which some might call ‘a theory’) about the move-
ments of bodies in space and the eects of gravity and so forth without any
formal training in physics, which they use to predict what physical bodies
will do or to explain why such bodies behave as they do, so too, presum-
ably, the layperson possesses a set of ideas about the minds of other people
or organisms without any formal training in psychology.e term ‘folk psy-
chology’ designates, in a very general way, this lay capacity. In sum, ‘folk psy-
chology’ is just a general term used rather loosely by philosophers to cover
a number of phenomena connected to the way that ordinary people seem to
think about minds.
But that looseness can become problematic. Consider, for instance, that
in the preceding overview we can identify not one but two distinct, albeit re-
lated, phenomena. First is the act of thinking about other minds: laypeople
actually seem to make use of mental state concepts in order to understand
what others will do, that is, to read minds. I will use the term ‘mindreading’
1 e example comes from David James Duncan’s novel,e River Why (1983).
2 According to Stich (1983), AdamMorton (1980) coined the term.
3 Formore on the analogy with folk physics, see (Baron-Cohen et al. 2000) and (Greene and
Cohen 2004).
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(not ‘theory of mind’) when I want to refer, narrowly, to just this activity.
e second is the set of linguistic practices that ordinary people tend to en-
gage in when they read minds and when they talk about their mindreading.
ey talk about beliefs, desires, wishes, fears, intentions, and so forth. I will
frequently call this folk psychological linguistic practice ‘description,’ since
it amounts to describing the activity of mindreading. us the lay capacity
designated by the term ‘folk psychology’ actually consists of two related ac-
tivities: the primary act ofmindreading, and the closely associated linguistic
practice of description that may well reveal something about that primary
behavior (henceforth where I use ‘folk psychology’ I mean it in just this gen-
eral way).
Of course, this basic distinction betweenmindreading and linguistic de-
scription has already been recognized in the literature (e.g., Nichols and
Stich 2003; Strijbos and de Bruin 2013) and even identied as a potential
source of confusion for disputes about theory of mind (e.g., Slors 2012). But
its implications continue to be underappreciated. So too are the problems
that arise from inconsistent and imprecise employment of the term ‘folk
psychology’ and its associated philosophical lexicon, which includes widely
used terms like ‘theory of mind’ and ‘theory-theory.’ Concerning this last
point, it now seems to be conventional to use the term ‘theory of mind’ for
what is properly called ‘mindreading.’ But the term ‘theory of mind’ implies
that folk mindreading is facilitated by a theory. e view (or theory) that
folk mindreading is facilitated by a theory is called the ‘theory-theory.’us
the terms ‘theory of mind’ and ‘theory-theory’ are properly interchangeable,
and that means that the term ‘theory ofmind’ is now regularly used in places
where ‘mindreading’ is actually intended (see also Note 10 below). Oddly
enough, in a move characteristic of the literature on folk psychology, Mar-
raa (2011) oers just this observation about the misuse of the term ‘theory
of mind’ in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP) before proceeding
to preserve this terminological convention in an entry on mindreading that
is actually entitled “eory ofMind.” Terminological inconsistency abounds
in this literature.
In the next section I outline four of what seem to me to be worrisome
cases of terminological—and perhaps also conceptual—inconsistency and
confusion that have appeared in arguments concerned with folk psychology
among philosophers and psychologists. Even where these problems have al-
ready been identied, I think that too little has been done to reevaluate the
existing literature in light of them. In fact, in two of themost prominent elec-
tronic encyclopedias in academic philosophy, the aforementioned IEP and
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP), there exists no general entry
for the term ‘folk psychology’ at all, despite widespread use of the phrase
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in academic work. No doubt there are other closely related entries in those
resources—good ones—that summarize and address a great deal of the aca-
demic literature that falls somewhere under the heading of folk psychology,
including Marraa’s entry, “eory of Mind” in the IEP, and Ravenscro’s
entry, “Folk Psychology as aeory” in the SEP. But, as I have just showed,
they come prepackaged with the literature’s tangled terminology, and gener-
ally work around rather than reassess terminological diculties. To be clear,
I do not mean to blame the problem on these authors, who no doubt rightly
intend their entries to capture and explain existing conventions, however
problematic they may be. I only want to point out that terminological in-
consistency is readily apparent in this literature, and that it may be more
problematic than it rst seems.
Even so, I will not attempt an exhaustive encyclopedic overview of the
literature on folk psychology.e goal is to oer a fresh look at folk psychol-
ogy by getting back to basics, as it were. is involves reexamining some of
the existing terminological and conceptual conventions and drawing atten-
tion to some very basic questions about folk psychology that some specialists
writing highly technical papers directed at other specialists now regularly
skip. In doing so I think we will nd that some of the terminological prob-
lems actually reect more signicant conceptual problems. ese include
the conation of folk and philosophical perspectives on the mind and men-
tal states, the conation of mindreading with theory of mind, a tendency to
treat folk verbalizations as neutral evidence for theoretical postulates, and a
tendency to lump disputes about philosophy of science and mind together
with questions about the mechanisms that facilitate folk mindreading. Be-
cause these diculties have clouded the study of folk psychology, I suspect
that they have had the tendency to occlude more pressing concerns about
the methodology we use to study folk psychology. I will thus sketch what
I take to be a methodological problem for folk psychology, and nally oer
some reasons to think the problem is insurmountable. Ironically, though, in
examining that insurmountable methodological problem, I think we stand
to gain much more useful insight into the way people—folk and specialists
alike—think about minds than we ever got from ignoring it.
2. Some terminological and conceptual problems
In this section I explain four cases of terminological, and potentially also
conceptual, problems identiable in the literature on folk psychology.en
in the following section I will try to draw some broader conclusions about
their impact on the study of folk psychology.
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2.1 Mindreading vs. the language of folk psychology
In the previous section I suggested that the distinction betweenmindreading
and folk psychological description is sometimes ignored. at problem is
visible in Stich’s (1983) inuential treatment of folk psychology. He writes:
In our everyday dealingswith one anotherwe invoke a variety of com-
monsense psychological terms including ‘believe’, ‘remember’, ‘feel’,
‘thinking’, ‘desire’, ‘prefer’, ‘imagine’, ‘fear’, andmany others.e use of
these terms is governed by a loose knit network of largely tacit prin-
ciples, platitudes, and paradigms which constitute a folk theory. Fol-
lowing recent practice, I will call this network folk psychology. (Stich
1983, 1)
As introduced, the target phenomenon here—the thing to be explained—is
folk psychology. It is taken as a given that the use of the language of folk psy-
chology is governed by principles that form a theory of concept usage.at
is a problem because those principles, if they existed as part of an implicit
theory, would directly govern the theoretical mental state postulates that the
terms track, not the terms that in turn track those concepts.ough it is not
yet clear that the conation is philosophically signicant, it is a mistake to
lump the phenomena together from the start. It is not self-evident that the
principles governing terminological conventions are identical to the princi-
ples governing the deployment of concepts. Indeed adult speakers regularly
deploy terms and phrases in ways that indicate that do not fully grasp the
corresponding concepts and are simply parrotingmore procient speakers.4
e line between language and concept deployment needs to be scrutinized
here rather than shaded over.
2.2 Phenomenon vs. mechanism
Stich’s description of this target phenomenon immediately steers us toward
the idea that ordinary people (the folk) are governed by tacit principles and
theoretical postulates, that is, by a theory.is view that mindreading is fa-
cilitated by the layperson’s grasp of an actual theory of mind is a view held
by specialists called the ‘theory-theory’ or sometimes ‘theory of mind.’ Pro-
ponents of the theory-theory argue that what explains the ability to predict
and explain behavior is that the layperson grasps, even if only implicitly, a
set of theoretical mental state postulates, like beliefs, desires, hopes, fears,
wishes, and so forth, that they rely on in understanding behavior.
4 Some common examples of the problem have come to be called eggcorns, e.g., using the
term ‘Old-timer’s Disease’ where the goal is to pick out what more competent speakers
mean by ‘Alzheimer’s Disease’ or using the expression ‘one in the same’ where ‘one and the
same’ is intended.ere are many such (rather entertaining) examples.
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It should be evident that in tying the explanation of the target phenome-
non directly to the theory-theory we conate two dierent things: what peo-
ple do, and how specialists think they might do it. Stich is not alone in pre-
senting the target phenomenon this way. Paul Churchland (1989) opens his
book with the following outline of mindreading:
We understand others, as well as we do, because we share a tacit com-
mand of an integrated body of lore concerning the lawlike relations
holding among external circumstances, internal states, and overt be-
havior. (Churchland 1989, 2)
Similarly, Horgan and Woodward (1985) write in the very rst sentence of
their paper ine Philosophical Review:
Folk psychology is a network of principles which constitutes a sort of
common-sense theory about how to explain human behavior. (Hor-
gan and Woodward 1985, 1)
ese opening descriptions—which seem intended to be relatively neutral
descriptions of the target phenomenon—actually come much closer to
sketching what we might call the mechanisms that facilitate mindreading
than either the behavior of mindreading itself or the linguistic practices as-
sociated with mindreading. What they describe is one possible theoretical
explanation—a theory according to which the folk rely on a tacit theory of
mind (the theory-theory, or the having of a theory of mind)—rather than
just the target phenomenon itself.
It is worth noting that the conation of phenomenon with mechanism
is probably reducible to the rst terminological problem. Because our only
direct access to the prevalence of the phenomenon we intend to explain,
i.e., mindreading, comes to us by way of contact with ubiquitous folk psy-
chological description, it is easy enough to slip into seeing that description
as reecting access to a set of concepts that constitute the mechanisms of
mindreading. Yet, where we should be especially cautious about navigating
this complex relationship between language and mechanism, some authors
actually explicitly take folk linguistic practices for clear evidence of what is
actually in the heads of ordinary mindreaders. And, interestingly, not all of
them are even proponents of the theory-theory.
For example,Maibom (2003, 301), who actually rejects the theory-theory,
does so by insisting that ordinary people “seem to master the concepts” in-
volved inmindreading attributions.at is, she rejects the traditional theory-
theory account in favor of amodel-based account ofmindreading, but in the
course of the argument nevertheless commits explicitly to the view taken
for granted by some proponents of the theory-theory, like Stich, that folk
linguistic descriptions are genuine attributions involving the deployment of
concepts:
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I am not rst a competent attributer of folk psychological states and
then learn to use psychological concepts inmy various projects. . .Chil-
dren acquire psychological concepts at roughly the same time they
learn to make psychological attributions. (Maibom 2003, 301).
e worry is that she would seem to have us just accept that linguistic prac-
tices, like the use of the terms ‘belief ’ and ‘desire,’ amount to genuine attribu-
tions of mental state concepts. But, as I have just said, we have to recognize
that phenomenon and mechanism can be readily teased apart. In fairness,
she does follow up the claim by citing the work of Wellman. However, as I
will show in §4,Wellman too seems tomistake linguistic practices (the use of
the terms ‘belief ’ and ‘desire’) for mechanisms of mindreading (deployment
of concepts) in his own empirical work.
What is particularly interesting about this example is thatMaibom actu-
ally sets out to help “esh out” (Maibom 2003, 314) the theory-theory by de-
veloping a model-based account of the mechanisms of mindreading.is is
necessary, she says, because proponents of the theory-theory, like Stich, can-
not make good on the claim that the folk theory is implicit, and the model-
based view furnishes a way to give up the claim without having to insist that
the folk have explicit knowledge of universal generalizations about mental
states. But in the course of eshing out the view, she ends up committing
the very same error that I have just said proponents of the theory-theory
sometimes do: committing, on too little evidence, to the view that linguis-
tic utterances (i.e., folk descriptions of behavior) amount to genuine mental
state attributions that require a grasp on concepts (i.e., committing to a par-
ticular mechanism that would explain mindreading).5 e only dierence
is that Maibom at least seems to commit explicitly to the idea, gesturing to-
ward some empirical evidence to support it, rather than merely neglecting
the crucial distinction. But, as I have said, I will try to cast doubt on the
quality of that evidence in §4.
5 It would be interesting to investigate whether it is possible to develop model-based ac-
counts of mindreading, like Maibom’s, without importing the still unsubstantiated as-
sumption that ordinary linguistic practices must reect a folk grasp on mental state con-
cepts. If so, perhapsmodel-based accounts could help us get traction on understanding the
actual mechanisms of mindreading. Nevertheless, I remain somewhat pessimistic for the
reasons I detail in the nal section. Separating linguistic practice from the mechanisms
of mindreading is a dicult task, and the kind of work that psychologists are currently
doing—which I also discuss in §4—does not seem sucient to show that people really
have a grasp on the relevant concepts. So, as it stands, the model-based accounts seem to
struggle with the same problem that all accounts of mindreading seem to struggle with:
the problem of distinguishing between the observable phenomenon (linguistic practices)
and mechanisms. I discuss that problem more formally in the next section.
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2.3 Mechanism vs. philosophical theory of mind
A third common conation is evident in the opening sentences of Stich’s
next chapter, which is tellingly titled “eeory-eory” despite being the
very rst chapter in a section titled “Folk Psychology.”ere we are told that:
Whatmaywell be themostwidely accepted theory about the nature of
commonsensemental states is the viewMortonhas labeled the theory-
theory. ‘Functionalism’ and the ‘causal’ theory are more common la-
bels for the doctrine. (Stich 1983, 13)
is too neglects a crucial conceptual distinction. e theory-theory is a
specialist’s explanation, the truth of which is heavily disputed, of the mech-
anisms that facilitate folk mindreading. at is not the same thing as, or a
synonym for, a philosophical account of the nature of commonsense mental
states. It could not be, because we do not knowwhether commonsensemen-
tal states map onto anything at all in reality (i.e., to real mental states), and
the view that they do is a contentious theory in philosophy of mind called
functionalism.
Functionalism is a philosopher’s theory of mind, not a theory of the
mechanisms of folk mindreading. It holds, very roughly, that mental states
are to be dened and delineated by what they do, i.e., by the function they
serve in the organism. It is thus a view about the actual nature of men-
tal states. Of course, this philosopher’s theory of mind may well have im-
plications for philosophical views about how ordinary people think about
and talk about what is in each other’s heads (i.e., ‘folk psychology’ under-
stood generally). Nevertheless, that is not the same thing as a theory about
the mechanisms that facilitate folk predictions and explanations of behav-
ior, which in this case is held to be an implicit theory that includes mental
state postulates (which themselves could be either roughly accurate or com-
pletely defective). At best, the theory-theory and functionalismwill turn out
to be rather closely related if it turns out that the folk really do use a theory
(i.e., the theory-theory is true) and that the analytic functionalist was right
all along that something in reality must ll the roles postulated by the folk
theory (see Jackson and Pettit 1990). But even if the theory-theory turns out
to be true and the analytic functionalist is right, the former is still a theory of
folkmindreadingmechanisms and the latter a philosophical theory ofmind.
ey are theories that purport to explain dierent things, and so they cannot
be interchangeable.
2.4 eory of mindreading vs. theory of mind: Whose proposi-
tional attitudes?
Since at least the time that Churchland (e.g., 1989) and Stich (e.g., 1983) were
oering widely discussed arguments about folk psychology, a fair amount of
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work that we now tend to associate with folk psychology has focused on the
status of eliminativism and the associated question whether beliefs and de-
sires can be analyzed as propositional attitudes (see Gordon 2009). is is
perhaps a rather peculiar feature of the literature, however, because in ret-
rospect some of these arguments may have had—and were perhaps even in-
tended to have—relatively little to do with how ordinary people conceive of
mental states, and much more to do with the development of philosophical
theories of mind. Much like in the previous section, there are two dierent
questions here: ‘How does folk mindreading really work?’ and ‘What the-
ory of mind can philosophers construct from folksy resources, regardless
of whether the folk actually use such a theory?’. In the absence of some ar-
gument demonstrating the contrary, these questions must be distinguished
because the status of the philosophical theory may not necessarily tell us
anything about the actual mechanisms of mindreading in ordinary people,
and vice versa. Strangely, though, there are cases in the literature in which it
is dicult to tell—even within one author’s single chapter—which of these
two distinct questions is under consideration.6 I’ll demonstrate using argu-
ments from both Churchland and Stich.
e basic connection between the two questions might seem clear
enough. e dominant philosophical explanation for mindreading is the
theory-theory account, and that account holds that folksymental state terms
like ‘belief ’ and ‘desire’ designate genuine theoretical constructs. Prominent
defenders of this theory-theory view (though in very dierent forms and
with very dierent motivations) include Paul Churchland, Alison Gopnik,
and the Canberra School analytic functionalists Frank Jackson, Philip Pet-
tit, and Stephen Stich. Proponents of the theory-theory sometimes claim
that these constructs can be analyzed as propositional attitudes. is pro-
positional-attitudes analysis, as I’ll call it, essentially says that the states the
folk postulate in their folksy theory take the form of propositional attitudes,
i.e., attitudes we hold toward propositions, which are themselves statements
about the world that bear truth-values. If I believe that the Earth is round,
one might say that I take an attitude of assent toward the proposition, ‘the
earth is round.’7 Analyzing folk mental state postulates as propositional at-
6 I exclude here work on the so-called platitudes analysis associated with David Lewis (e.g.,
1970) that is explicitly engaged in constructing a psychological theory from folksy resources.
7 Philosophers sometimes explain such propositional attitudes in the form of that-clauses:
I believe (i.e., assent to the proposition) that the Earth is round. Some, e.g., Schroeder
(2004), even conceive of desires in this way as well. When I want or desire to drink a beer,
I have the attitude of desiring toward the state of aairs: I desire that I should drink a
beer.at is, I take an attitude of desire toward the state of aairs expressed in the propo-
sition ‘I drink a beer.’ is is obviously clumsy, and so there is dispute about whether it is
appropriate to conceive of desires as propositional attitudes.
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titudes has been a real focal point of the literature on folk psychology. Yet
it seems to me that the crucial question for determining whether this issue
really has much to do with folk psychology is a rather basic one: Whose
propositional attitudes—the philosopher’s or the folk’s? e former would
seem to make the propositional-attitudes analysis part of a philosophical
theory of mind, which is, once again, not the same thing as an account of
the mechanisms that enable folk mindreading.
Presumably there are two ways of addressing this question that would
succeed in preserving the relevance of the philosopher’s propositional-atti-
tudes analysis to the actual facts about folk mindreading: either argue that
there is no real distinction between these two projects (i.e., between develop-
ing a philosophical analysis of mental states as propositional attitudes and
explaining the actual mechanisms of mindreading), or argue explicitly for
the claim that the folk really do use a theory ofmental states as propositional
attitudes and then proceed to explain the precise sense inwhich they actually
use it, i.e., is it explicit or only implicit? In either case, one would expect the
chosen solution to be readily detectable in the project. It is strange then that
at least in two prominent projects that extensively integrate folk psychology
and the propositional-attitudes analysis—fromChurchland (1989) and Stich
(1983)—this is never really made clear. Neither explicitly attempts to show
that the two projects are identical, or even explicitly states that assumption
from the start. Perhaps this suggests that their projects intend to take the
second route, holding that the propositional-attitudes analysis is relevant to
folk psychology because the folk actually use such a theory.
But, in turn, if the second approach were intended, one would expect
it to be clear how the folk use such a theory. Is the claim that the folk ex-
plicitly understand mental states as attitudes toward propositions, or is the
claim rather that they somehow use a propositional-attitudes analysis only
implicitly, without any explicit grasp on how they really are conceiving of
mental states like beliefs and desires?
e case for the claim that the folk actually use the propositional-atti-
tudes analysis—if that is what is really intended—would seem to depend on
assessing such crucial details as whether the theory is explicit or implicit.
Yet both Churchland and Stich at times seem to move back and forth be-
tween these views, making it rather dicult to tell whether the project is
really supposed to reveal anything about folk psychology at all. For exam-
ple, Stich (1983, 1, emphasis added) introduces folk psychology as the use of
mental state terms “governed by a loose knit network of largely tacit prin-
ciples, platitudes, and paradigms.” Yet throughout the argument he seems
to rely on the assumption that the theory is explicit. Here he describes the
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development of philosophical and psychological behaviorism—theories of
the nature of the mind—as being at odds with folk psychology:
As behaviorism ourished, a chasm began to open in our culture.e
picture of the mind shared by the historian, the poet, the political
theorist, and theman in the street was being rejected by the vanguard
of scientic psychology. (Stich 1983, 1)
is passage, like many others in the chapter, clearly presupposes that the
ordinary “man in the street” really has a picture of the mind that could be
upended by a technical theory of mind like behaviorism. Indeed if the ordi-
nary person’s theory were really tacit, it is hard to see how it could be upset
by the rise of behaviorism in academic philosophy and psychology. is is
peculiar. e easiest, and I think most charitable, solution here is to simply
read Stich as having little interest in what ordinary folk are actually doing
when they talk about beliefs and desires, except insofar as their folksy ways
of talking about minds can be—and perhaps have been—spun into a fuller,
more technical philosophical or psychological theory of the mind. Aer all,
that seems to be theway that others have interpreted the project (seeGordon
2009) and here Stich even seems to say so himself:
From antiquity to the beginning of the twentieth century, such sys-
tematic psychology as there was employed the vocabulary of folk psy-
chology.ose who theorized about themind shared the bulk of their
terminology and their conceptual apparatus with poets, critics, histo-
rians, economists, and indeed their own grandmothers. (Stich 1983,
1, emphasis added)
e real target, then, is the systematized version of folk psychology built up
from the familiar folk terminology.is suggests that Stich’s project was al-
ways about specialized philosophical or psychological theories ofmind. But,
in that case, that it is so closely tied to the theory-theory and folk psychol-
ogy seems really misleading in retrospect. Perhaps Stich intended this to be
rather obvious from the start. Even so, the point remains that our thinking
about folk psychology stands to benet from drawing a much clearer line
than we nd here between what the folk actually do and what philosophers
can do with folksy resources in trying to determine the proper foundations
for cognitive science.
at same line is blurred in a nearly identical way in Churchland’s (1989)
work on folk psychology and the propositional attitudes. Like Stich, Church-
land repeatedly describes folk psychology as a “tacit command of an inte-
grated body of lore” (Churchland 1989, 2). But he is also prone to implying—
even in the very same chapter—that the propositional understanding ofmen-
tal states is explicit. In describing the eects of folk psychology’s eventual
Daniel F. Hartner 33
elimination on the future human beings who will witness its demise, he
writes:
How will such people understand and conceive of other individuals?
To this question I can only answer, “in roughly the same fashion that
your right hemisphere ‘understands’ and ‘conceives of ’ your le hemi-
sphere: intimately and eciently, but not propositionally!” (Church-
land 1989, 21)
Now this particular passage might be mere hyperbole or rhetorical ourish,
but it is nevertheless part of an entire section devoted to the eventual eects
of elimination, some of which are supposed to pertain to ordinary people
and human social and legal institutions. It is hard to understand why the
(explicit) philosophical realization that the propositional-attitudes analysis
is radically defective would have any eects on people who are using such an
analysis only implicitly, which is to say, without any real awareness of it. If
the theory is currently both implicitly used and actually false, then whatever
eects its falsity has should already be detectable. Ordinary people would
presumably only feel the eects of the realization that the theory is false if
they were using the theory explicitly. Maybe Churchland really does think
that ordinary people use the theory in some explicit way. To be clear, my
goal is not to try to upend Churchland’s view. I only mean to point out that
it is rather peculiar that this issue about whether the theory is implicit or
explicit—as central as it is for understanding the actual mechanisms of folk
mindreading—would be unclear in a project so closely connected to folk
psychology.at is why I think we get a clearer idea of Churchland’s project
by simply detaching his defense of eliminativism from any real connection
to folk psychology or the theory-theory. It is more sensible to read elimi-
nativism as a theory concerned with assessing a philosophical theory of the
mind built up from folk vocabulary rather than as a theory of how the folk
actually readminds. And since the theory-theory is concerned with how the
folk actually readminds and not with whether we specialists can use folk vo-
cabulary to develop an accurate, technical theory of mind, it seems Church-
land’s view does not really require much recourse to the theory-theory aer
all.
In fact Churchland’s commitment to the theory-theory just seems to
cause unnecessary trouble for him, since he then has to square the claim
that the folk really use a theory with the eliminativist claim that that pu-
tative theory of mind is “a radically false theory, a theory so fundamentally
defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theorywill eventu-
ally be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed neuroscience”
(Churchland 1989, 1). But, as critics have rightly asked, if the theory is that
defective, how could it really be an implicit guide to anything for ordinary
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people? What can it really mean to claim that the folk implicitly or tacitly
use an analysis of mental states as propositional attitudes—an analysis they
do not explicitly grasp—that turns out to be so radically defective that the
principles of the theory have to be displaced rather than reduced by neu-
roscience? Presumably what it would mean for ordinary folk to implicitly
grasp the theory without an explicit understanding is that in some way their
approach is latching onto the true account of mental states as propositional
attitudes. But then it is hard to make sense of the claim that the theory is so
radically defective. Horgan andWoodward (1985) and Horgan and Graham
(1991) have used exactly this observation against the forms of eliminativism
oered by both Churchland and Stich. But if eliminativism is really just con-
cernedwith a philosophical theory ofmind built from folk vocabulary rather
than with an actual folk theory, this objection loses its force. It makes more
sense to think of eliminativism as being aimed at a defective philosophical
theory constructed from folk vocabulary rather than at a genuine folk the-
ory, and in that case the theory-theory seems to have little relevance to the
issue.
It is hard to saywhether the initial plausibility of the connection between
the theory-theory and eliminativism was the cause of confusion over what
the theory-theory is really about or simply facilitated by it. In either case
that connection is much weaker than it looks. ese views are readily de-
tachable. For example, a theory-theorist could insist that the folk do use a
theory to read minds, adequate or defective, and nevertheless still maintain
that specialists can use the folk vocabulary to construct a dierent, presum-
ably better, theory of mind that serves as an adequate foundation for cog-
nitive science. Conversely, an eliminativist could argue that the specialist’s
theory of mind that is built from folk vocabulary is radically defective and
therefore an inadequate foundation for cognitive science, and nevertheless
not claim that (or even care whether) the folk ever actually used that con-
structed theory. Perhaps they use some other simpler one. At times this
seems to be exactly what Churchland and Stich are claiming. So unless we
stipulate that for some reason the theory-theorist has to mean that the folk
use the same theory as the one that philosophers can reconstruct from folk
resources, the theory-theory and eliminativism seem like they can be quite
easily separated. In other words, insofar as the term ‘theory-theory’ desig-
nates the view that the folk really do use a theory, it is not clear that either
Churchland or Stich need or want to talk about the theory-theory at all.
And so it seems the eliminativist could just as well argue that the pro-
positional-attitudes analysis of mental states is not an actual folk theory, not
a layperson’s tacit command of an integrated body of lore that includes the
propositional-attitudes analysis. It is rather a defective philosophical theory
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that fails to t the psychological facts. As Churchland himself has argued so
persuasively, the time frame for our everyday, folk cognitive processes does
not t very well with the hypothesis that ordinary people rely in some way
on propositional deductions to reason about the world or about what other
people will do, nor do people understand propositional logic well enough to
reason with propositions, as by deducing one proposition from others (see
Churchland 1989, 199). As it stands, these considerations make it rather dif-
cult to see the point of his commitment to a propositional-attitudes analysis
of the theory-theory, of folk psychology, in the rst place. at the dispute
about the propositional-attitudes analysis has been so closely connected to
folk psychology and mindreading strikes me as deeply misleading.
ese issues should have been more clearly disentangled before they
had a chance to generate further confusion. For example, if eliminativism
is not actually aimed at eliminating a commonsensical view of the mental,
but rather claims that the philosophical theory of mind built from the re-
sources of commonsense vocabulary is radically defective, then one could be
an eliminativist of Churchland’s sort without committing to the claim that
folk psychology constitutes a genuine theory, i.e., without committing to the
theory-theory, or indeedwithout sayingmuch at all about how the folk actu-
ally readminds.is is somewhat ironic given that, as Gordon (2009) points
out, the development of the simulation theory—which oered new hope of
upending the theory-theory—was met with particular interest precisely be-
cause it seemed to open up the possibility that the dispute between elimi-
nativists and psychological realists over the proper foundation of cognitive
science was baseless. Given the preceding, these two disputes may have had
much less to do with each other than it seemed. Whether a theory of mind
externally constructed from the resources of folk vocabulary is the proper
foundation for cognitive science seems like a perfectly viable question—the
question of interest to Churchland and Stich—even if the simulation theory
had managed to show that ordinary people do not actually use a theory.
2.5 How did we get here?
In retrospect, some of the foregoing terminological and conceptual prob-
lems were perhaps inevitable given at least two features of the development
of this literature. First, folk psychology as an area of serious philosophical
inquiry has had an unfortunate developmental trajectory. As I just showed
in §2.4, over the last thirty years or so philosophical explorations of folk
psychology have been tied to other disputes or theoretical commitments
in analytic philosophy. Even as disputes about folk psychology were hav-
ing their heyday in the philosophical literature in the 1980s and ‘90s, owing
largely to the contributions of the Churchlands and Stich, the emphasis was
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less on understanding and unpacking the phenomenon than using it as a
springboard to the defense of complicated methodological and metaphysi-
cal commitments in philosophy of mind and science. Intertheoretic reduc-
tion, eliminativism, neurocomputationalism, the representational theory of
mind, and so on, were the real focus, not understanding folk psychology
per se. e result has been a literature that oen approaches folk psychol-
ogy from the periphery, as a means to some other philosophical end. is
in itself has probably abetted a fair deal of the terminological inconsistency
and yielded a body of literature that is not particularly accessible to those
working outside some of the central disputes in analytic philosophy of mind
and science, exacerbating the problem.
Secondly, and perhaps in part as a result of the diversions caused by the
preceding terminological and conceptual confusions, far too little attention
has been paid to the role that folk psychological description plays in the
study of folk psychology. Folk psychology is a research area that deals exten-
sively with how ordinary people talk about minds. Talking about minds can
be tricky enough. Talking about how other people talk about minds requires
keeping track of quite a few layers of analysis. Furthermore, this second-
order mind-talk tends to be carried out by philosophers and psychologists
who make observations and formulate theories about how such mind-talk
works using much of the very same vocabulary—the language of beliefs and
desires and so forth—that ordinary folk use in their (rst-order) mind-talk.
ey do that, of course, because they have no alternative. Psychology’s spe-
cialized theories are built up from a familiar folksy vocabulary.
Folk psychology is an area of research that is quite unlike any other in
this particular way. Technical professions like medicine, economics, law,
and so on, typically adopt distinctive technical terms to help avoid precisely
the kinds of confusions generated by employing ordinary lay terminology to
more rigorous forms of inquiry. In the case of folk psychology that approach
appears to be unavailable.ough the problem has been recognized in var-
ious ways (e.g., Hutto 2008; Slors 2012), its impact on research in this area
continues to be underappreciated. I think it poses a signicant methodolog-
ical problem for research on folk psychology that warrants more attention.
3. Folk psychology’s methodological problem
To outline the problemmore formally, it will help to establish some termino-
logical conventions consistent with the preceding discussion. I will continue
to treat folk psychology as a blanket term covering both the practice ofmind-
reading—the apparent ability of ordinary people to predict what others will
do—and the ways in which they talk about minds. I will call the latter folk
psychological description or linguistic practice. ese terms refer strictly to
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the ordinary, and seemingly unavoidable, talk about mental states (e.g., ‘Bill
Bob believes his pocket bible is a checkbook’). I will use the termmechanism
to refer to the actual mechanism—the psycho-neural process(es), whatever
they may be—that actually make it possible for ordinary people to success-
fully read minds (assuming that they do).
Finally, the distinction between description and mechanism is in turn
further complicated by the presence of two distinct perspectives on folk psy-
chology: that of the lay mindreader and that of the specialist (the philoso-
pher, psychologist, etc.). I propose to call the lay folk perspective the in-
ternal perspective, and the specialist’s perspective the external perspective.8
We might think of internal and external here as perspectives on a shared
framework, a shared language of folk psychological description. When I
mindread, my perspective is internal; when I study the nature of mindread-
ing, it is external. When I describe behavior using the language of beliefs
and desires, my perspective is internal; when I attempt to study the way in
which ordinary people employ the language of beliefs and desires, my per-
spective is external. For example, there is a dierence between how a layper-
son might explain her ability to read minds when pressed for information
and the way in which a researcher would describe what facilitates that per-
son’s ability. When a layperson is pressed for information about how they
understand Bill Bob’s real mental states, they are engaged in hypothesizing
about mechanisms from the internal perspective. By contrast, when a spe-
cialist investigates the neural and/or psychological processes that facilitate
successful reading of Bill Bob’s mind, they are engaged in the mechanism
question from the external perspective.9
e methodological problem is the problem of determining how it is
possible to separate, from an external perspective, folk psychological de-
scription from the mechanisms of mindreading well enough to study the
latter directly. It is thus the question: How can we objectively investigate
the mechanisms of a phenomenon (mindreading) observable only through
the very same linguistic framework (folk psychological description) that ap-
8 Unfortunately, Stich and Ravenscro (1994) have already introduced an internal/external
distinction in some of their joint work. eirs distinguishes between mindreading (inter-
nal sense of folk psychology) and Lewis’ platitudes account of folk psychology (external).
is distinction is rather dierent from what I’m proposing here. eirs appears to ig-
nore the distinction between dierences in perspective in description or folk psychologi-
cal language. Also, as Ravenscro (2010) notes, they have dropped their internal/external
distinction in part because the terminology has not caught on.
9 It is possible that the internal perspective on the mechanism question never really arises
at all. Here I’m not interested in whether every product of intersecting distinctions is a
tenable research program in itself. I’m only marking conceptual distinctions and showing
that they intersect.
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pears to answer the mechanism question? Everything we know, or think we
know, about the way ordinary people read minds comes to us through the
lens of folk psychological description. Some of that information comes from
internal self-report (I know how I think about minds), some from others’
reports of their internal experiences (we can ask how others go about think-
ing about minds), and some from external observation (I can observe in the
eld, so to speak, that others talk in ways that seem to reect their thinking
about minds), but in all cases the data comes by way of folk psychological
description. In this way our linguistic practices are a permanent confound
to investigating the mechanisms of mindreading. Delineating mindreading
as a phenomenon requires employing a descriptive vocabulary that invari-
ably appears from the external perspective to track a set of theoreticalmental
state constructs. It is a problem that grows out of the shared language—folk
psychological description—of the internal and external perspectives on folk
psychology.
Given that researchers, like laypeople, are stuck with the vocabulary of
folk psychology, we might expect them to read too much o of folk vocabu-
lary and to nd abundant evidence for the view that ordinary people really
do have a theory ofmind, i.e., for the theory-theory.10 And in fact this seems
to account for some of the conceptual and terminological errors outlined
earlier, for example, the tendency explain folk vocabulary as a set of theo-
retical postulates, and the tendency to treat mindreading as a synonym for
having a theory ofmind. Indeed some philosophers have even argued explic-
itly that the inevitability of talk about beliefs and desires seems to support its
claim to empirical adequacy (see Horgan and Woodward 1985 and Horgan
and Graham 1991). But as major milestones in the development of psychol-
ogy and philosophy of mind show, that line of reasoning has to be defective.
e fact that my introspective examination reveals my own dependence on
beliefs and desires does not tell me which came rst: the language or the
concepts. It is just as plausible that I think I rely on beliefs and desires pre-
10 In this section I continue to resist convention and use the terms ‘theory of mind’ and
‘theory-theory’ interchangeably when grammar permits. e only dierence is that
we should tend to use ‘theory of mind’ in rst-order discussions of mindreading (e.g.,
‘Churchland believes that people have a theory of mind’) and ‘theory-theory’ in second-
order discussions of specialists who are arguing aboutmindreading (e.g., ‘Churchland sub-
scribes to the theory-theory’). But the target referent is the same.e theory that ordinary
people have a theory of mind is called the ‘theory-theory’ for short. Either you think ordi-
nary people have a theory of mind or you deny it. e philosophical/empirical claim that
ordinary people do not use a theory of mind is typically defended by way of the simulation
theory, but theremay be other non-theory-postulating accounts ofmindreading to oppose
the view that mindreading is facilitated by a theory of mind. Not so for the theory of mind.
Either people have a genuine theory of some kind (the theory-theory is true) or they do
not (simulation theory or some other non-theory-theory alternative is true).
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cisely because that is the only way I know how to talk about them as it is
that I talk about them because I actually understand and use them. It is, as
the old expression goes, a kind of chicken-and-egg question, and an old one
with a rich history.
Exactly thismystery about the right causal ordering of language and con-
cepts has gured centrally in such psychological developments as the death
of introspection as a serious method in psychological science (am I really
reporting my mental states or just lling them in as I talk?), the develop-
ment of the James-Lange theory of emotion, which reversed our ordinary
way of thinking about emotions as causal forces (perhaps I’m scared be-
cause my parasympathetic nervous system is activated, not vice versa), and
of course in the rise of philosophical behaviorism and logical positivism (so-
called ‘mental states’ are just ways of talking about behavioral processes). It
was also the central question that led to the development of folk psychol-
ogy as an area of research. at question, going back Sellars’ (1956) “Myth
of Jones,” is essentially whether our folk psychological language tracks our
concepts or vice versa. One possibility is that my linguistic descriptions of
others’ behavior come to be applied, internally, to myself. In this way, I nd
in my own head, somewhat literally, the mental state concepts that begin as
linguistic characterizations of hard-to-observe behaviors, like subtle bodily
expressions (fears, hopes, and so on). Once I learn to wield these linguistic
tools, I apply them tomyself, creatingmental state postulates. An alternative
account might say that the mental states are real and language simply tracks
them—language has developed out of a need for a way to talk about mental
goings-on.
So the history of this old problem of the relationship between language
and concepts really is in some sense just the history of psychology’s devel-
opment and its tangled relationship with philosophy of mind, especially, the
rise of behaviorism, which had hoped to address the problem of unreliable
introspective access by doing away with the focus on mental states and their
familiar attendant language altogether. But for such a familiar problem, the
signicance of its implications for research on folk psychology has been con-
sistently underappreciated. How is that possible?
Perhaps it is because this issue has remained for so long unsettled that it
gradually became common practice to ignore it and return to other interests
in philosophy of mind, like the mechanisms of mindreading. Or perhaps, as
I argued in §2.4, it is because some of the putative research on folk psychol-
ogy was never really all that concerned with actual folk mindreading at all.
Whatever the explanation, it makes little sense to carry on talking about folk
psychology without returning to that problem directly. Any investigation of
the mechanisms of mindreading is bound to face the question of whether
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we are studying genuinemental processes or merely the way that people talk
about behavior and dispositions in terms of psychological states. I have two
unreliable options for understanding what is in someone else’s head: infer-
ring from my own experience to hers on the basis of her behavior (when it
parallels mine) or simply asking her. Both rely on introspective examination
and report. With any such report, I do not know whether the reports track
the mental states or vice versa. As Freud showed, paceDescartes we lack di-
rect access or awareness to our own mental processes. Furthermore, as we
might say in more contemporary parlance, people are prone to rationaliza-
tion, confabulation, and self-deception.
But aer Sellars, research on mindreading pressed on, and eventu-
ally two predominant theories of the mechanisms of mindreading emerged,
namely the theory-theory and the simulation theory. Proponents of the sim-
ulation theory seem to deny that mindreading involves the use of a set of
theoretical postulates. ey hold instead that reading other minds is an act
of rst-person simulation. To understandwhat others do, andwhat they will
do, we (the folk) simulate their mental experience within ourselves. No set
of theoretical postulates is required, then, since we simply employ our own
cognitive facilities, shiing to the perspective of another agent. e dispute
wages on and so far the results have been, in light of the preceding, rather
predictable.e theory-theory is, it seems fair to say, the dominant account.
is is predictable because the dispute is obviously confounded by the fact
that there is only one linguistic framework for reporting mental processes:
thewaywe all naturally talk aboutmental processes.e research question is
predisposed to generate an answer that supports the view that ordinary peo-
ple have a theory of mind (i.e., the theory-theory). Because the mechanism
problem has to be settled by research that has no possible platform other
than the platform that generated the theory-theory, it is to be expected that
its main competitor, the simulation theory, emerged much later and has al-
ways seemed dicult to dene or explain without emphasizing the parts of
the theory-theory it denies (see the accounts in Marraa 2011 and Gordon
2009 for examples).
Oddly enough, critics of eliminativism very nearly brought the method-
ological problem to the fore in insisting that eliminativismwas self-defeating
since it could not even be formulated without clear linguistic recourse to the
very folk states it proposed to eliminate (e.g., Rudder-Baker 1987).e elim-
inativist believes there are no beliefs!e objection has beenmore than ade-
quately addressed by eliminativists. But where it should have succeeded was
in returning our attention to themethodological problem: researchers inter-
ested in themechanisms that facilitate mindreading are always stuck behind
description, i.e., a vocabulary that invariably seems to posit a set of concepts
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that serve as a mechanism for reading minds. It is just that the right con-
clusion to draw from this is not that folk psychological language must track
real theoretical mental state postulates that actually facilitate mindreading
because everyone has to use such language including eliminativists, but pre-
cisely the opposite: that we cannot even address the mechanism question
properly without a more neutral linguistic framework, which seems incred-
ibly unlikely given the unavoidable tendency for self-professed eliminativists
to regularly use commonsensemental state terms just like the rest of us.at
more important point was missed, I suspect, because the real focus was not
so much understanding folk mindreading as it was defending philosophi-
cal theories of mind. Having formally outlined the problem, it is worth one
more demonstration of its impact on research programs, but this time from
the empirical side. I think the illustration can help to shed light on the nature
of psychological science.
4. e methodological problem in empirical psychology
Gopnik and Wellmann (1992) have argued that the evidence from studies
of child development overwhelmingly supports the theory-theory over the
simulation theory. Since the argument has garnered considerable philo-
sophical attention over the years, it makes a poignant example. Children,
they claim, really do rely on an implicit theory containing postulates like be-
liefs and desires in order to predict and explain what others do.e theory-
theory account of mindreading, they maintain, ts the data in ways that its
primary competitor, the simulation theory, does not. eir argument de-
pends on the demonstration of some key empirical results from studies that
aim to explain how children predict, explain, and interpret behavior. But
failure to address the methodological problem is plainly visible here.
First, they claim, children’s explanations, in open-ended explanation
tasks, show a “theory-like pattern”:
In open-ended explanation tasks. . . children are simply presented an
action or reaction (‘Jane is looking for her kitty under the piano’) and
asked to explain it (‘Why is she doing that?’).ere are many mental
states thatmight be associated with such situations. Yet 3- and 4-year-
old children’s answers to such open-ended questions are organized
around beliefs and desires just as adults’ are (‘she wants the kitty’; ’she
thinks it‘s under the piano’). Moreover, there is a shi in explana-
tory type between two and ve. Two-year-olds’ explanations almost
always mention desires, but not beliefs. Asked why the girl looks for
her doll under the bed they will talk about the fact that she wants the
doll, but not the fact that she believes the doll is there. ree-year-
olds invoke beliefs and desires, and some threes and most 4- and 5-
year-olds consistently refer to the representational character of these
42 Folk Psychology Revisited
states, explaining failure in terms of falsity. (Gopnik and Wellmann
1992, 153–154)
ere are clear potential confounds here associatedwith the role of linguistic
development in general and the development of folk psychological language
(i.e., the way that researchers prompt children to talk about mindreading) in
particular.e task is an open-ended question—‘Why is the girl looking for
the doll under the bed?’—which, as Gopnik and Wellman are using it here,
is intended not as a test of linguistic comprehension but as a neutral test for
the mechanisms of mindreading.
But because the goal is to use the task to distinguish between competing
accounts of howmindreading works, it is only a viable task to the extent that
the child succeeds inmindreading.us, the taskwill succeed in its intended
purpose only if two conditions are met: (i) the child’s response clearly indi-
cates adequate comprehension of task (otherwise it cannot serve as a genuine
test of the mindreading mechanism but rather of linguistic development),
and (ii) it is a genuinely neutral test for the mechanisms of mindreading,
i.e., there are conceivable answers capable of satisfying (i) that would not
immediately serve as evidence in favor of the theory-theory. It is impossible
for any response to the task to satisfy both of these conditions. Any answer
which succeeds in satisfying (ii)—by avoiding the language that would favor
the theory-theory account—will succeed only in virtue of violating (i), i.e.,
by being so linguistically incoherent that it would simultaneously show that
the task has not been adequately comprehended. If this is right, such a task
could show nothing about the mechanisms of mindreading.
In fact, the only conceivable response that even an adult could give to
this question that would not reveal a misunderstanding of the task is some-
thing resembling the claim that the girl is looking under the bed because
she believes the doll is under the bed, and because the girl wants to nd the
doll. Nothing else will do. Suppose, for example, the child utters complete
nonsense in response (e.g., ‘because kitty,’ or ‘she eats waes,’ or even some-
thing more grammatically sophisticated but plainly irrelevant like ‘I stayed
at a Holiday Inn Express last night’).ese answers would immediately sug-
gest that the task has not been comprehended and so cannot reveal anything
about themechanisms of successful mindreading.e same goes for a result
in which the child oers no response at all, or responds to the question with
bewilderment.
Now consider a more coherent response that might otherwise be taken
to undermine the theory-theory. Suppose the child responds with an answer
couched in rst-person language. e child says that the girl is looking for
the doll under the bed because, ‘I saw you put it there.’ Here wewould still be
forced to conclude that the task has been inadequately comprehended, since
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the question is about a third party (a girl looking under the bed) rather than
about the experimental setup. ere is simply no conceivable response that
will succeed in conrming that the task has been adequately comprehended
without thereby vindicating, or at least providing evidence in favor of, the
theory-theory. e very task—at least as it is being used in this context—is
built on the methodological problem, that is, the problem of determining
how it is even possible to extricate the study of mindreading from the study
of the language of mindreading. At most what a task of this sort is capable
of showing about the mechanisms of mindreading is the near-tautology that
when children respond coherently to questions couched in the language of
folk psychology, they do so with responses couched in the language of folk
psychology.
Second, Gopnik andWellman argue that something resembling the the-
oretical constructs of belief and desire facilitate the child’s ability to predict
what others will do in complicated cases. Some of the best evidence for the
child’s use of the theory-theory, as they see it, comes the well-known false-
belief task, which was itself designed as a test for the presence of theory of
mind. In a common version of the task, a child is presented with a story of
two characters (typically portrayed using dolls) in which the rst character,
Sally, leads the second character, Anne, to have a false belief by moving an
item (a box of crayons, a marble, etc.) from its original location to a new
location while Anne is not looking. A child who understands the events
and wields a theory of mind should, in theory, be capable of predicting that
Anne will look in the original location, because she falsely believes the item
remains in the same location.uswhen children are askedwhereAnnewill
look for the item, they pass the test if they report the original location and fail
if they report the new location. Gopnik and Wellman maintain that young
children, with their rudimentary non-representational concept of percep-
tion and desire, cannot account for complex representational relations be-
tween themind and the world.us we should expect that, if children really
do have an early non-representational form of the theory-theory at work,
they should fail the false-belief task:
Both desires and perceptions, on the 2-year-old view, involve simple
non-representational causal links between the world and the mind. . .
is theory cannot handle cases of misrepresentation. . .e theory
also cannot handle other problems that require an understanding of
the complexity of the representational relations between mind and
world. . .e most well-known instance of such an incorrect predic-
tion is, of course, the false-belief error in 3-year-olds. . . . (Gopnik and
Wellmann 1992, 155)
e thrust of the argument is that because children’s false-belief predictions
fail in the ways that the theory-theory mechanism would predict were that
44 Folk Psychology Revisited
mechanism under development, the theory-theory must be under develop-
ment in children. And since it is under development in children, it, rather
than the simulation theory, is more likely to be the mechanism explains
mindreading.
e initial assumption here—the idea that if the theory-theory account
is right, a rudimentary form of it will be detectable in experiments with
children—is plainly problematic. Given the methodological problem with
disentangling the deployment of folk psychological description from the
mechanisms, it is quite plausible that we would nd evidence of basic folk
psychological vocabulary in conversations with children about others’ be-
havior even if no such mechanism were at work.is is because, as we have
just seen, the questions posed to the children themselves employ folk psy-
chological language and, as a corollary, any answer to an experimental task
couched in the language of folk psychology will be read as coherent only if
it too responds with that language (the only language anyone, including the
researcher, has at his or her disposal). Any answer that does not will suc-
ceed not in undermining the theory-theory mechanism but the child’s very
ability to adequately participate in the study.
Moreover, the argument depends on the following conditional: if chil-
dren are using a rudimentary, non-representational form of the theoretical
constructs ‘belief ’ and ‘desire’, then their predictions will fail in cases that re-
quire representational states.emethodological problem looms large here.
e setup of the conditional is problematic. ere are lots of explanations
beyond the limitations of a rudimentary desire perception theory that would
equally well explain the child’s failure in tasks that require explainingmental
representation (like false-belief tasks). e most obvious alternative, which
is inexplicably never considered in the course of the argument about child
development, is that the child simply lacks the linguistic capacity to fully
comprehend and/or adequately respond to the question. What evidence do
we really have that the child even understands what is being asked? Prima
facie, it seems problematic to assume that a child who purportedly lacks the
conceptual capacity to deal with others’ representational states well enough
to verbally attribute false beliefs to others nevertheless adequately under-
stands questions about the behavior of other agents when those questions
could only be satisfactorily answered by wielding mental state terminology
in conjunction with a complex grammar.
To be sure, some controls are used in such studies to rule out the pos-
sibility that the child comprehends nothing at all about the task. Typically
the child’s eligibility can be determined by simply testing whether they’re
capable of engaging in a very basic discussion about objects like puppets.
But such controls are irrelevant. In principle, none could ever rule out the
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conation of language with mechanism in the way required to genuinely
vindicate the theory-theory. For, once again, the only possible control that
could rule out the confound without already begging the very question the
study is intended (in this context) to test is one in which the child (i) demon-
strates prociency in using the kind of complex language about others that
would be needed to attribute representational mental states in the course of
an explanation but (ii) without using the kind of language that a researcher
will take to vindicate the theory-theory. ere is no conceivable response
that could satisfy both of these requirements. A coherent response to the
question requires recourse to terms resembling beliefs and desires. us
any child that understands the questions will have achieved that milestone
only by progressing along far enough in their linguistic development to be-
gin using the language of the theory-theory.
ere are just two nal points worth considering. First, we have to be
careful to separate the validity of the false-belief task, which is really de-
signed only to test whether children can read minds, from its use as a test
for how children read minds, which is how Gopnik and Wellman are using
it. e fact that linguistic competence cannot be readily extricated from re-
sponses that would seem to favor the theory-theory does not seem to present
any special problem for the false-belief task in itself, so long as in using it we
are content to study facts about a child’s linguistic development in conjunc-
tion with the child’s development of mindreading. All competent speakers
use the language of the theory-theory, and in that sense it seems we have
to accept that part of the very question the false-belief task is rightly aer
is whether kids are far enough along in their development to begin using
such language. I am concerned here only with evaluating its use as a test of
the mechanisms of mindreading.is is a kind of o-label use. When one’s
aim is to use a false-belief task as a neutral test of the mechanism of mind-
reading, the methodological problem becomes a barrier. Any child who can
legitimately participate in the study by wielding the language of mental state
representations will, in virtue of using the only language available for that
purpose, appear to be employing a theory of mental states, thereby support-
ing the theory-theory.
Second, the preceding critique has focused exclusively on so-called ex-
plicit false-belief tasks in which children are required to verbalize their re-
actions to false-belief scenarios. But implicit (or nonverbal) versions of the
task, in which researchers rely strictly on behavioral cues to determine
whether the child is mindreading (or, as they wrongly tend to say, whether
the child has a theory ofmind), require no such verbalizations from the chil-
dren. ey rely instead on researchers’ observations of looking times (e.g.,
Onishi and Baillargeon 2005) and even on more sophisticated data from
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eye-tracking soware (Southgate et al. 2007). In both cases, however, the
researchers must interpret visual cues—how long a child looks at the false-
belief scenario—as a sign that the child is surprised by the kinds of false-
belief experiments I described above. Is it possible that these implicit ver-
sions of the task oer a way out of the methodological problem?
e proposal may be worth exploring, though I remain skeptical. In
fact I suspect that these tasks actually manage to show even less about the
mechanisms of mindreading than the explicit cases. As I just said of the ex-
plicit versions, the implicit tasks are built to test whether the child is reading
minds, not how. Even if the researchers mistakenly claim the test is looking
for a ‘theory of mind’ (a common terminological error), it is actually testing
formindreading. At bottom the test is merely a test of whether the child’s ex-
pectations about what another personwill do have been deed. But showing
that they have is not thereby evidence for the theory-theory, since presum-
ably those deed expectations could also be explained by simulation theory
or some other non-theory alternative.
In fact, the moment we begin to think that the implicit tasks really do
serve as evidence for the theory-theory, we should start to wonder whether
there is any data that we could ever accept as evidence for any account of
mindreading other than the theory-theory. For if the evidence for the very
existence of the phenomenon that the theory-theory is intended to explain
(i.e., the child looks longer at false-belief scenarios) is also evidence for the
theory-theory, then it has become impossible to extract the phenomenon
from the proposed mechanism and there is no genuine test for mechanisms
here at all. Instead, it looks a lot like the test for themechanism comes loaded
with a virtually unfalsiable research hypothesis. It is only falsied when the
entire test is rejected. Tomake this point evenmore obvious, consider it from
the other direction. If we assume that the implicit test might be able to tell us
something about themechanisms ofmindreading, and then run the test and
nd that the child fails it, that is, she does not in fact look longer at the false-
belief scenario, does this show that the child is not using the theory-theory,
or only that she is not yet able to readminds (does not have a ‘theory ofmind’
as the researchers say)? e point here is that, just as in the explicit case, if
this is to be taken as a genuine test of the mechanisms of mindreading, we
have to be able to specify the conditions under which the child demonstrates
mindreading competence but does not thereby automatically provide evi-
dence for the theory-theory.e only dierence between using the implicit
test for evidence of the theory-theory and using the explicit test is that in the
implicit case we simply skip the step that makes the methodological prob-
lem more obvious. In the explicit case the researcher poses a question the
only coherent response for which requires that the child use language that
Daniel F. Hartner 47
would automatically vindicate the theory-theory. In the implicit case the
researchers need not even bother to lead the subject to vindicate the theory-
theory. ey simply interpret the child’s behavior on their behalf using the
only language any of us have for talking about mental states: the language of
the theory-theory. For these reasons it seems to me that no false-belief task
of any kind has much to oer the question whether mindreading requires a
genuine theory of mind.
5. Folk psychology and the autonomy of psychological science
I want to briey sketch one of the larger conclusions that I am inclined to
draw from the preceding explication of folk psychology’s methodological
problem. As space is limited, it is more a sketch than a complete argument.
But it may oer a useful perspective on what the challenge of studying folk
psychology reveals about the nature of psychological science and the con-
tentious question of its status as an autonomous science.
In total I have outlined ve conations in the literature on folk psychol-
ogy: mindreading with description, phenomenon with mechanism, mecha-
nism of mindreading with philosophical theory of mind, folk vs. philosoph-
ical use of propositional attitudes, and, in empirical practice, the conation
of evidence for description with evidence for mechanism. What appears to
drive most of these conations is a vocabulary that ranges over both inter-
nal and external perspectives on the way people appear to deal with mental
states. e internal perspective is the rst-order perspective of the mind-
reader as they (apparently) manipulate mental state terms.e external per-
spective is the second-order perspective from which we assess how mind-
reading works. It seems to be remarkably dicult to avoid running these
together in the course of an argument about folk psychology, particularly
because specialists always occupy both perspectives simultaneously. us a
philosophical account of how mindreading might actually work comes to
be blended with an account of the way ordinary people talk about minds,
thereby treating an internal linguistic practice as a window into a mecha-
nism; an external philosophical analysis of mental states as propositional
attitudes gets projected onto folk minds as a theory visible in their own ac-
count of their internal processes; intuitive and presumably learned ways of
talking come to be treated as empirical evidence for an actual psychologi-
cal mechanism of mindreading from an external perspective rather than as
mere evidence for the development of the same language we all use from the
internal perspective. In such cases, perhaps we export something internal,
taking it as genuine evidence of mechanisms visible from an external per-
spective. If this diagnosis is right, it suggests a simple solution: researchers
can do better about disentangling the perspectives, keeping them distinct in
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the course of research on folk psychology. I am inclined to think that that
suggestion is not so simple aer all.
emost obvious reason that the internal and external perspectives can-
not be so easily disentangled is, as we have already seen, precisely because
there exists no alternative descriptive or linguistic framework for articulat-
ing observations about mindreading from the external perspective. Even
for specialists the language of folk psychology is unavoidable. Philosophers,
psychologists, and neuroscientists of various stripes deal in beliefs and de-
sires and the like. No compelling solution to this problem has ever been
provided.e Churchlands, for example, worked hard to piece together de-
scriptions of observable behavior couched entirely in the language of low-
level neuroscience for the purpose of suggesting that, with the proper train-
ing, people might over time learn to speak the complex language of neuro-
science and leave o any talk about beliefs and desires. But it always seemed
a stretch at best. And it ought to, because even really good neuroscientists,
for all their concern with careful scientic methodology, tend to trade in be-
liefs and desires inside their own research projects—indeed much of neuro-
science is, or is related to, cognitive neuroscience, which relies heavily on
familiar psychological concepts like belief. Serious scientists employ these
concepts regularly even in technical work because they simply have no al-
ternative. e prospects for suddenly developing an alternative to folk psy-
chological description seem really poor.
ere is a helpful parallel here with Nagel’s famous (1974) paper address-
ing the likelihood of our developing a reductive physicalist explanation of
consciousness. Nagel showed that there is a plain conceptual problem with
reducing a fundamentally subjective rst-person phenomenon to an objec-
tive perspective: objective perspectives work by taking you away from sub-
jectivity, which in the case of consciousnessmeans taking you away from the
very phenomenon you had hoped to explain. He concluded that we might
have to hold out for a new set of concepts and a new method of “objective
phenomenology not dependent on empathy or the imagination” (Nagel 1974,
449). Forty years later, we are no further along on that project either.
e problem that Nagel identied is probably a species of the same prob-
lem that plagues folk psychology. It is a problem of language, and the odds
of solving it in the case of folk psychology are equally grim. For in the case of
folk psychology, the task is to develop a new linguistic framework for deal-
ing with mindreading that would allow us to take an objective, external per-
spective on how mindreading really works and still somehow account for
the familiar language of beliefs, desires, and so on as an integral part of the
phenomenon of interest. But, to adapt Nagel’s point to folk psychology, any
linguistic framework that could succeed in objectively describing howmind-
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reading works without begging the question in favor of the theory-theory
will succeed in virtue of moving away from the target phenomenon we had
hoped to describe: it will take us away from the familiar language of beliefs
and desires, leaving us no way to say anything useful about that language,
which is integral to understanding the phenomenon that piqued our inter-
est in the rst place.
As a result, I’m inclined to draw a dierent conclusion. Rather than see-
ing the problems with studying folk psychology as a challenge to develop
new concepts andmethods, as Nagel did for consciousness, I think we ought
to see it instead as evidence for a version of the autonomy of psychology
thesis, though not of the sort that traditional proponents of psychological
autonomy would want to endorse.
e autonomy of psychology is a phrase that grew in popularity with the
publication of Fodor’s famous (1974) paper “Special Sciences,” that advanced
a form of functionalism at the expense of reductive physicalism. Propo-
nents of the autonomy of psychology generally hold that psychology enjoys
(a common way of putting it) a kind of independence from neuroscience. It
has long been a fancy way of insisting that psychology has nothing to fear
from the progress of neuroscience, since it is inconceivable that the kind of
high-level cognitive work conducted by psychologists could be done more
accurately by scientists engaged directly with real physiological processes in
the brain, as reductive physicalists were betting. Special sciences like psy-
chology thus cannot be reduced to more basic physical sciences by way of
neuroscience. e implication has always been that psychology is and will
remain a viable, empirically respectable science in its own right, regardless
of what neuroscience might turn up about how the brain works.
In suggesting that folk psychology’s methodological problem exposes
the autonomy of psychology, I do not mean to endorse this view. ough
I am drawn to the view that psychology is an autonomous science for a va-
riety of reasons, I am much less convinced that it remains the kind of inde-
pendent science that genuinely aims to reveal bare facts about the world as
it is independently of human experience. Psychology probably is in many
respects an autonomous science, but my suspicion is that it does not exactly
enjoy that autonomy. I think, rather, the main line of argument in this paper
shows that it suers from it.
What plagues psychology, unlike lower-level (e.g., cellular and molec-
ular) neurosciences, for example, is a particularly insidious kind of theory-
ladenness in the course of picking out the phenomena to be investigated.e
unavoidable vocabulary of psychology common to the internal and external
perspectives compromises the ability of psychology to reach the world as it
is in itself by generating research goals that focus on the world as we shape
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it with our linguistic conventions. For example, a psychologist might want
to understand the nature of our beliefs, or the eects of having particular
beliefs on some other hypothesized state like motivation. Unlike trying to
understand how a particular gene contributes to the development of a par-
ticular phenotype, or how complexes of proteins facilitate the transport of
ions across cell membranes, such questions depend much more heavily on
the terminology we use to formulate the question than they do on the bare
empirical world. at is not to deny that ‘genes’ or ‘cells’ or ‘proteins’ are
terms that shape our empirical investigations in some way. But their impact
is signicantly less than in the case of psychology. We can empirically con-
rm that something like ions cross something like cell membranes, however
we describe the process. But we still do not even know what it reallymeans
to say that Bill Bob believes his pocket bible is a checkbook. As the logi-
cal behaviorists and ordinary language philosophers taught us, it is possible
that the entire question rests on a confused way of talking, a mere artifact of
our peculiar language. However wrong wemight be about ion channels, it is
not likely that we could be wrong in the same way we could be wrong about
mental states. In the case of psychology, the linguistic framework wreaks
havoc not merely on understanding the mechanisms of the phenomena of
interest, but on picking out the phenomena themselves that are to serve as
proper targets of empirical investigation of the world.
ere is a slightly dierent way of putting this point, which is due origi-
nally toCarnap (1950) andwhich has been helpfully revived byBickle (2003).
Carnap distinguishes between internal and external questions about linguis-
tic frameworks, where internal questions are those that work from within,
or presuppose the entities specied by, the linguistic framework, and exter-
nal questions are questions about the framework itself, such as whether the
entities it postulates are real. For Carnap, as for Bickle, a linguistic frame-
work agreed upon by scientists does not entail ontological commitments.
Scientists agree for practical and linguistic reasons to use certain terms, but
they are not attempting to establish ontological facts with such terms. As
a result, the terms are meaningless outside the framework, and so external
questions about whether the terms used in the framework map onto reality
are meaningless. Carnap used the distinction to deal with pesky metaphys-
ical questions about science, such as whether numbers are real, by showing
that such questions wrongly take scientic terms outside their agreed upon
framework, rendering those questions meaningless.
e distinction between internal and external perspectives in folk psy-
chology maps neatly onto Carnap’s internal/external distinction. We may
either be situated internally with respect to the language of folk psychology,
employing beliefs and desires to predict and explain behavior as ordinary
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people do, or we may step outside that framework, as the specialist (say a
scientic psychologist) wants to do, to make sense of that folk language and
its relationship tomindreading.e peculiar problem in the case of psychol-
ogy and its folk counterpart is that psychological terms like belief and desire
gure centrally in both the language of the layperson and the language of the
psychological specialist. Academic psychology, insofar as it studies concepts
like belief and desire as part of the mind, is forever taking internal language
outside its internal framework.
us we might say that the autonomy of psychology is a product of its
unavoidably moving between internal and external perspectives given the
inevitable vocabulary of beliefs, desires, and the like. To want to understand
what beliefs really are, in the real world, for example, is to take a term inter-
nal to a ubiquitous and widely accepted linguistic framework and use it to
pose external, objective questions about what such terms refer to out there
in the world. But that question has already been answered: they just refer
to verbal utterances the folk use in the course of trying to explain why Bill
Bob is tearing pages out of his pocket bible. at is what ‘belief ’ means be-
cause the term comes from established folk convention, not from psychol-
ogy. Of course, the psychologist could insist that her project is rescuing the
term from problematic usage, but in that case the term would need to be
assigned a new operational denition built from the resources of scientic
psychology rather than folk vocabulary, and the subsequent research would
have nothing to do with the concept as ordinarily understood.e psychol-
ogist could just bite that bullet, except that in the peculiar case of psychology
it is impossible, because there simply is no alternative conception of belief
disconnected from the way that folk use the term.e only observable phe-
nomenon on which to build the operational denition for ‘belief ’ is the way
that ordinary people talk about beliefs, for that is where the term comes from
in the observable world.
us any empirical test for the validity of the operational denition de-
pends on an analysis of folk linguistic conventions rather than any real em-
pirical work having to do with minds as they really are in the world. Spe-
cialists can still argue about how to ‘properly’ conceive of the nature of be-
liefs, but that is just good old-fashioned conceptual analysis in philosophy
of mind, not the empirical study of the psychological world.
is suggests that psychology actually suers from its autonomy in the
sense that its inability to objectively investigate its own terminological de-
cisions empirically results in its detachment from the empirical world. Psy-
chology, unlike neuroscience, formulates the distinctive language it uses to
build theories about the mind from facts about folk linguistic practices, not
from facts about how minds really work in some objective sense. By simply
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assuming that its terminological decisions track facts about minds rather
than folk language, it can proceed as any good science should, with care-
ful methodology designed to test theories. In that sense it remains a kind of
science. It may well be a very valuable one for a variety of purposes. But per-
haps as with some forms of economics, its theories, to the extent that they
actually purport to address minds rather than behavior, are to be under-
stood not as accurate depictions of the external world as it is independently
of human conventions (the “science of the mind”) but rather as accounts of
how the world is through the lens of our unavoidable terminological con-
ventions. Its ability to say anything about the bare facts about our world
is always constrained by its inability to empirically vet its own operational
denitions. us it is a kind of science tethered more to human language
than the bare empirical world. And since the study of folk psychology relies
on all of the same terminological conventions as academic psychology, it is
no surprise that our attempts to study it objectively suers from the same
methodological problem.
Folk psychology is just a term for the way that ordinary people dabble in
the subject matter of “real” psychology. But unlike the relationship between
physics and folk physics, in the case of psychology the academic versionmay
well be nearly as indierent to the bald empirical facts about minds (if there
are any) as its folk counterpart. It is the autonomy of psychology in this sense
that probably best accounts for all the trouble we’ve hadmaking sense of folk
psychology.
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